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Abstract
We consider a problem where the principal chooses a project from
a set of available projects for the agent to work on. Each project
provides some profit to the principal and some payoff to the agent
and these profits and payoffs are the agent’s private information. The
principal has a belief over these values and his problem is to find an in-
centive compatible mechanism without using transfers that maximizes
expected profit. Importantly, we assume partial verifiability so that
the agent cannot report a project to be more profitable to the principal
than it actually is. In this setup, we find a neat characterization of the
set of incentive compatible mechanisms. Using this characterization,
we find the optimal mechanism for the principal when there are two
projects. Within a subclass of incentive compatible mechanisms, we
show that a single cutoff mechanism is optimal and conjecture that it
is the optimal incentive compatible mechanism.
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1 Introduction
There exist many situations in which a principal, who has to make a deci-
sion, relies on the information reported by an agent about the true state of
the world. Since their preferences might be misaligned, the agent has to be
incentivized to truthfully reveal his private information. These incentive con-
straints depend on the agent’s set of feasible messages which has typically
been assumed to be fixed and independent of the true state of the world.
This is a valid assumption if the agent can always manipulate information
without incurring any cost or penalties. However, the agent’s ability to ma-
nipulate may be limited due to various physical and mental costs associated
with lying or due to existence of some form of evidence which the agent is
required to furnish. The existence of such environments where manipulation
is costly motivates the literature on mechanism design with partially verifi-
able information.
The assumption of partial verifiability can take different forms depending
upon the environment. In this paper, we focus on settings where the agent
cannot oversell an alternative to the principal. In particular, we consider a
problem where the principal has to choose a project from N different projects
but does not know how profitable each is. The agent gets an independent
payoff from working on the chosen project and is aware of both the principal’s
profit and his own payoff from each of the N projects. Thus, the principal
needs to incentivize the agent to reveal this private information. The idea
of no-overselling is formalized by assuming that the agent cannot report a
project to be more profitable for the principal than it actually is. With this
partial verifiability constraint of no-overselling, we consider the problem of
characterizing the set of implementable mechanisms and finding one that
maximizes the principal’s expected profit.
Since partial verifiability reduces the set of incentive constraints that the
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principal faces, the set of implementable mechanisms is potentially larger.
Thus, there is reason to believe that with partial verifiability, the principal
can obtain a higher expected profit than what is possible in the standard
problem with no constraints on the message space. However, previous re-
search suggests that this is not always the case. For instance, Celik [8] con-
siders the problem of regulation of a monopolist in which the monopolist can
understate its productivity by hiding equipment but cannot overstate it by
disclosing equipment that does not exist. He identifies a sufficient condition
under which the solutions to the two problems coincide. Another example is
Moore [22], who shows that in an auction environment where the buyer can-
not imitate higher valuation types, the solution to the principal’s expected
revenue maximization problem remains the same. Thus, even though it seems
intuitive that partial verifiability should allow the principal to obtain higher
rent, the above results suggest it is not always true. Our objective is to study
if the no-overselling constraint in our setup leads to a different solution and
higher profits for the principal.
We restrict attention to truthfully implementable direct mechanisms with-
out transfers in our analysis [15]. In these mechanisms, the principal com-
mits to choosing a project based on the profits and payoffs reported by the
agent. We obtain a neat characterization of incentive compatible (IC) mecha-
nisms and call them “table mechanisms.” In a table mechanism, the principal
commits to choosing the agent’s favorite project among those that satisfy a
criterion. The set of projects satisfying the criterion (those that are “on
the table”) is increasing in the reported profit values and always includes
a default project. Next, we show that the optimal IC mechanism for two
projects is a cutoff mechanism. In the class of cutoff mechanisms, we show
that a single cutoff mechanism defined by a parameter c is optimal. In this
mechanism, a project is on the table if and only if its reported profit meets the
cutoff profit c. This cutoff mechanism is different from the optimal incentive
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compatible mechanism in the standard problem and leads to higher profits
for the principal. Indeed, without partial verifiability, the best the principal
can do is select a project without soliciting any information from the agent.
Thus, in contrast to the results mentioned above, there is a significant gain
for the principal from the partial verifiability constraint of no-overselling in
this setup.
1.1 Literature review
Mechanism design has often been used to deal with problems of asymmetric
information [24], [25]. An important theme in the literature on mechanism
design is characterizing the set of implementable mechanisms [14], [27], [9],
[15]. In particular, Green and Laffont [15] introduce the idea of partially veri-
fiable information in mechanism design and identify a necessary and sufficient
condition, called the “Nested Range Condition”, under which the set of im-
plementable mechanisms coincides with the set of truthfully implementable
mechanisms (i.e. the revelation principle holds). Later research focuses on
identifying implementability conditions in other environments with partially
verifiable information; [18] looks at Nash implementation, [10] considers lying
with finite costs, [4] and [30] allow for transfers, and [7] considers probabilistic
verification. Some computer scientists have looked at the trade-off between
monetary transfers and partial verifiability in terms of implementing social
choice functions [12], [13]. Our setup belongs to the environment considered
by Green and Laffont and satisfies their “Nested Range Condition”. Thus,
without loss of generality, we restrict attention to truthfully implementable
mechanisms in our analysis.
Some applied papers in this literature find optimal or efficient mechanisms
in environments with a specific form of partial verifiability ([21], [20], [22],
[8]). For instance, [23] argues using a model in which only some expenditure
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can be hidden that spouses hiding income and assets from one another is
efficient. [11] explains the complicated selling practices of real-world monop-
olists by considering an economy where some agents have limited ability to
misrepresent their preferences. This paper considers the partial verifiability
constraint of no-overselling and potentially explains the use of cutoff mecha-
nisms in settings where evidence is significantly easier to verify than to obtain.
Our work is most closely related to [2], [26] and [1]. [2] and [26] consider a
problem where the principal has to choose one of N agents who prefer being
chosen and provide some private value to the principal from being chosen.
In [2], the principal can verify his value from agent i at a cost ci, while [26]
assumes ex-post verifiability so that the principal can penalize the winner by
destroying a certain fraction of the surplus. [1] considers a project delegation
problem in which the principal can verify characteristics of the chosen project
but is uncertain about the set of available projects. These papers find their
respective optimal mechanisms for the principal and call them the favored
agent mechanism [2], shortlisting procedure [26], and the threshold rule [1].
While these mechanisms have some flavor of the cutoff mechanisms we obtain
in this paper, there are important differences in the setup we consider here.
Primarily, in their setups, the principal is empowered by ex-post verifiability
of the reported values and the ability to use a prohibitively high punishment
to deter the agent from telling any lie, whereas in our setup, the agent is
constrained in that he cannot oversell, but the principal does not have the
power to directly deter the agent from underselling.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we present the model and
definitions. Section 3 contains all the results. In section 4, we discuss some
other variants of the model and also compare our results with those from
some related papers. Section 5 concludes. The more technical proofs are in
the appendix.
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2 Model
There are two parties: a principal and an agent. The principal has to choose
a single project from the set of available projects [N ] = {1, 2, . . . , N}. Each
project i ∈ [N ] leads to values (pi, ai) where pi denotes the profit for the prin-
cipal and ai is the payoff to the agent. For all i ∈ [N ], we assume pi ∼ F and
ai ∼ G where both F and G have support in X = [0, 1] and that all pis and ais
are independent. While the principal has the correct belief about the project
values, the agent actually knows the profit vector p = (p1, p2, . . . , pN) ∈ XN
and the payoff vector a = (a1, a2, . . . , aN) ∈ XN for the N projects.
Given this setup, the principal chooses a mechanism d : XN ×XN → [N ]
which maps a profile of reported profits pi = (pi1, pi2, . . . , piN) ∈ XN and
payoffs α = (α1, α2, . . . , αN) ∈ XN to a chosen project i ∈ [N ]. The agent is
constrained so that he cannot report a project to be more profitable for the
principal than it actually is. This is the partial verifiability constraint of no
overselling. Formally, the agent’s message space under any mechanism d is
M(p, a) = {(pi, α) ∈ (XN)2 : pii ≤ pi ∀i ∈ [N ]}
If (p, a) is the project values and (pi, α) is the report, the mechanism d
leads to profit pd(pi,α) for the principal and payoff ad(pi,α) to the agent.
Definition 1. A mechanism d is incentive compatible if for any (p, a) and
(pi, α) ∈M(p, a)
ad(p,a) ≥ ad(pi,α).
In words, d is incentive compatible if for any possible realization of profits
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p and payoffs a, it is weakly optimal for the agent to report the true values
(among reports available to the agent).
Denote by IC the set of incentive compatible mechanisms1. Then the
principal’s problem is:
maxd∈ICE[pd(p,a)].
2.1 Definitions
We define a few special classes of mechanisms. The first is table mechanisms.
Definition 2. A mechanism d is a table mechanism if there exist functions
f1, f2, . . . , fN : X
N → {0, 1} such that
• there exists some i such that fi(p) = 1 for all p ∈ XN ,
• for i = 1, . . . , N , fi(p) is weakly increasing in pj for all j = 1, . . . , N ,
and such that
• d(p, a) ∈ argmaxi{ai : fi(p) = 1} for all (p, a) ∈ (XN)2.
Intuitively, one may think of a table mechanism d as follows. The princi-
pal commits to choosing the agent’s favorite project among those that satisfy
a criterion (those that are “on the table”). There is some default project that
is always on the table. Finally, the set of projects on the table is increasing
in their profitability for the principal. That is, if the profits of all projects
are weakly higher, the set of projects on the table is weakly greater.
For simplicity going forward, we will assume (without loss of generality)
that fN(p) = 1 for all p ∈ XN . That is, in a table mechanism, project N is
always on the table.
1Note that it is without loss of generality to consider incentive compatible mechanisms.
This is because our no-overselling constraint satisfies the Nested Range Condition (θ ∈
M(θ′), θ′ ∈ M(θ′′) =⇒ θ ∈ M(θ′′)) which is both necessary and sufficient for the
revelation principle to hold [15].
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Definition 3. A mechanism d is a cutoff mechanism if it is a table mecha-
nism and for i = 1, . . . , N − 1, there exist cutoffs ci ∈ X, such that fi(p) = 1
if and only if pi ≥ ci.
In a cutoff mechanism, a project is on the table if the principal’s profit
from the project meets a threshold. That is, whether a project is on the table
or not depends only on that particular project’s profit value. The principal
then chooses the agent’s favorite project among those that meet the cutoff
and the default.
Definition 4. A mechanism d is a single cutoff mechanism if it is a table
mechanism and there is a c such that for i = 1, . . . , N − 1, fi(p) = 1 if and
only if pi ≥ c.
A single cutoff mechanism is a cutoff mechanism in which all cutoffs are
the same.
3 Results
3.1 Preview
First, we characterize the set of incentive compatible mechanisms and show
that it is exactly the set of table mechanisms. Next, we show that for two
projects, a cutoff mechanism is optimal. Based on this result, we conjecture
that a cutoff mechanism is optimal for N projects and consider the problem
of finding the optimal cutoff mechanism and show that it is a single cutoff
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mechanism whose cutoff is given by2
c(N) = 1− 1√
N
+ o
(
1√
N
)
.
In particular, we show that the expected profit of the principal tends to 1 as
N tends to ∞.
3.2 Characterization of IC mechanisms
We begin by giving a characterization of the set of incentive compatible
mechanisms IC.
Theorem 1. d is incentive compatible if and only if it is a table mechanism.
It is fairly straightforward from the definitions to check that table mecha-
nisms are incentive compatible. Indeed, under a table mechanism, the agent
prefers reporting higher pi’s to reporting lower ones and, given any report of
pi’s, prefers reporting her payoffs to misreporting her payoffs (since such a
misrepresentation can only lead the principal to make a choice which gives
the agent a lower payoff.) The other direction is more involved.
Proof of Theorem 1. Suppose d is a table mechanism. Consider any pro-
file (p, a). If the agent reports some (pi, α), we know that pi ≤ p from the
constraint (pi, α) ∈M(p, a). Since the fi’s are increasing, this implies that
{i ∈ [N ] : fi(pi) = 1} ⊂ {i ∈ [N ] : fi(p) = 1}
Since the agent gets his preferred project among those available and report-
ing truthfully maximizes his set of available projects, the agent cannot gain
2Recall that for functions f(N), g(N), f(N) ∈ o(g(N)) if and only if
lim
N→∞
f(N)
g(N)
= 0.
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by misreporting. Therefore, d is incentive compatible.
Now, suppose that d is an incentive compatible mechanism. Define
the functions (fi) as follows: fi(p) = 1 if and only if there exists some
(p′, a′) ∈ (XN)2 with p′ ≤ p such that d(p′, a′) = i. Now, we want to show
that these functions satisfy the properties of the table mechanism. There is
some k ∈ [N ] such that the decision at a = p = (0, 0, 0...) is k. Hence, by
definition, fk(p) = 1 for all p. Now, consider any j and p
′ ≥ p and suppose
fj(p) = 1. This implies that there exists some (p
′′, a′′) ∈ (XN)2 with p′′ ≤ p
such that d(p′′, a′′) = j. Since p′′ ≤ p ≤ p′, by definition fj(p′) = 1, which
implies that f is increasing.
Now, consider any profile (p, a). We want to show that d(p, a) ∈ argmaxi{ai :
fi(p) = 1}. Suppose towards a contradiction that d(p, a) is not in this set. By
definition, d(p, a) ∈ {i : fi(p) = 1}. Thus, there exist j, k ∈ {i : fi(p) = 1}
such that aj > ak and d(p, a) = k. But then, there exist a
′ and p′ ≤ p such
that d(p′, a′) = j. Therefore, the agent has a profitable deviation (p′, a′),
which contradicts the fact that d is incentive compatible. Therefore, it must
be that d(p, a) ∈ argmaxi{ai : fi(p) = 1}. Thus, d is a table mechanism.
3.3 Optimal mechanisms
With this characterization of the incentive compatible mechanisms, we focus
on finding the optimal table mechanism. Here and for the remainder of the
paper, we will assume that pi, ai ∼ U([0, 1]) for all i.
Theorem 2. For N = 2, the optimal incentive compatible mechanism is a
cutoff mechanism.
Proof. Suppose d is incentive compatible. From Theorem 1, we know that
d is a table mechanism. So f2(p) = 1 for all p ∈ X2. Define c = sup{p1 :
f1(p1, p1) = 0}. For any arbitrary (p1, p2) ∈ X2, we show that the cutoff
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mechanism d′ with c1 = c is at least as good for the principal as the given
mechanism d. Consider the following (exhaustive and mutually exclusive)
cases:
• p1 ∈ [0, c), p2 ∈ [0, c): Under both d and d′, f1(p) = 0 and therefore, the
second project is chosen for all such profiles. Thus, the two mechanisms
are identical for such profiles.
• p1 ∈ [0, c), p2 ∈ [c, 1]: Under d′, f1(p) = 0 and therefore, project 2 is
chosen. Under d, the principal gets either p2 or
p1+p2
2
which are both
at most p2. Thus, pd′ ≥ pd for these profiles.
• p1 ∈ [c, 1], p2 ∈ [0, c): Under d′, f1(p) = 1 and since project 2 is
always available, the principal gets p1 with probability
1
2
and p2 with
probability 1
2
. Under d, the principal gets either p2 or
p1+p2
2
which are
both at most p1+p2
2
. Thus, pd′ ≥ pd for these profiles.
• p1 ∈ [c, 1], p2 ∈ [c, 1]: Under both d and d′, f1(p) = 1 and therefore, the
same project is chosen for all such profiles. Thus, the two mechanisms
are identical in this set.
This shows that for any IC mechanism that is not a cutoff mechanism,
there is a cutoff mechanism under which the principal’s expected profit is
strictly higher. Hence, any optimal IC mechanism must be a cutoff mecha-
nism. And indeed, since the principal’s expected profit from cutoff mecha-
nisms is continuous in the cutoff and the set of possible cutoffs is compact,
at least one cutoff mechanism is optimal.
Motivated by the result for two projects, we conjecture that a cutoff
mechanism is optimal for an arbitrary number of projects and consider the
problem of finding the optimal cutoff mechanism.
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The following theorem gives the optimal table mechanism in the class of
cutoff mechanisms.
Theorem 3. For general N , the optimal cutoff mechanism has a single cutoff
c(N) that is defined by the equation
N(1− c)(1− c+ cN) = 1− cN .
The principal’s expected utility from the corresponding optimal cutoff mech-
anism is given by
1
2
+
c(N)
2
(c(N)− c(N)N)
While it is hard to obtain an exact closed form solution for the optimal
single cutoff, we show that it has the following asymptotic property.
Lemma 4. The optimal single cutoff c(N) = 1− 1√
N
+ o
(
1√
N
)
.
Proof. Let
φN(c) = N(1− c)(1− c+ cN)− (1− cN).
Then for any α > 0,
lim
N→∞
φN
(
1− α√
N
)
= α2 − 1,
and so for all sufficiently large N , the quantity
φN
(
1− α√
N
)
is positive if and only if α > 1 and negative if and only if α < 1. Hence, for
any  > 0, it follows that the unique root c(N) of the equation from Theorem
3 satisfies
(1− ) 1√
N
≤ 1− c(N) ≤ (1 + ) 1√
N
.
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It follows from Lemma 4 that as N → ∞, the optimal single cutoff
c(N)→ 1 and the expected utility of the principal→ 1. The following graph
depicts the optimal cutoff for different number of projects.
Together, Theorems 2 and 3 give the solution to the principal’s problem
for the case of two projects.
Corollary 5. For N = 2, the optimal incentive compatible mechanism is a
cutoff mechanism with c1 =
1
2
.
4 Discussion and Future Work
In this section, we discuss how our results compare to some other results
in the literature and also study some simple and important variants of our
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model. We begin by discussing some useful interpretations of our model and
result. We then turn to comparing our model with variants in which (i) the
agent’s message space is state-independent, (ii) the principal can incentivize
the agent with message-contingent transfers, and (iii) the agent must sequen-
tially report the project values and there is no recall.
4.1 Some interpretations
The simplest implementation of the conjecturally optimal mechanism has a
nice delegation interpretation. The principal selects a cutoff profit and a
default project and delegates the project choice to the agent, in the sense
that the agent can select either the default project or a project which meets
the cutoff profit, and the principal signs off on the final decision. Under this
delegation, the agent chooses his favorite project among those that meet the
cutoff and the default project. Note in particular that this implementation
only requires the agent to report information about the chosen project. This
is outcome-equivalent to the cutoff mechanism.
We note that many instances of “cutoff mechanisms” with flavors similar
to ours have appeared in the literature, but the optimality of such mech-
anisms has been driven by the assumption of ex-post verifiability ([2], [26]
[1]). In particular, in most previous models the principal’s ability to punish
in the case of a misreport is tantamount to the assumption that the agent
cannot lie. Here, we offer an alternative way of rationalizing such cutoff
mechanisms via the no-overselling (or more generally, interim partial verifia-
bility) constraint, which alters the agents incentives but not by threatening
the agent in the case of a misreport. To help elucidate this point, we make
the following observation. If our model were altered so that the agent had
an unconstrained message space, but the principal were required to take the
default project in case the agent should oversell any of the projects, then all
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of our results would carry over.
4.2 Without partial verifiability
To investigate the impact of the partial verifiability constraint on the princi-
pal’s problem, we examine the principal’s problem without the no-overselling
constraint and compare the results to the ones obtained above. In this set-
ting, the principal’s problem is again to find an incentive compatible mech-
anism d : X2N → [N ] that maximizes his expected payoff. However, the
incentive constraints on a mechanism are now stronger.
Definition 5. A mechanism d is incentive compatible if for any (p, a) and
(pi, α) ∈ (XN)2
ad(p,a) ≥ ad(pi,α).
The following lemma characterizes the set of incentive compatible mech-
anisms in this setting.
Lemma 6. Without the no-overselling constraint, the following are equiva-
lent
• d is incentive compatible
• there exists S ⊂ [N ] with S 6= ∅ such that for all (p, a) ∈ X2N
d(p, a) = argmaxi{ai : i ∈ S}
• d is a table mechanism such that for all i ∈ N
fi(p) = 0 for all p ∈ XN or fi(p) = 1 for all p ∈ XN
Observe that for any incentive compatible mechanism, the decision at
any profile (p, a) is independent of p. That is, in an IC mechanism when the
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agent can oversell, the choice of the project cannot depend on the profit it
generates for the principal.
Lemma 7. Without the no-overselling constraint, the principal’s expected
payoff from any incentive compatible mechanism is E[pi].
Proof. The result follows from the above discussion and also the assumption
that the agent’s and principal’s values are iid.
In particular, when the principal’s values are drawn uniformly from [0, 1],
his expected profit is 1
2
for all N . That is, he can do no better by incen-
tivizing the agent than by randomly choosing one of the projects. On the
other hand, when the agent cannot oversell, the principal can get an expected
profit that is greater than E(pi) for any number of projects and increases to
1 as N → ∞. Thus, the principal can obtain a significant gain from the
no-overselling constraint.
4.3 With transfers
To compare the power that partial verifiability confers on the principal with
the power that the ability to make transfers does, we examine the prin-
cipal’s problem when there is no partial verifiability but the principal can
use transfers to incentivize the agent, and we compare the results to the
ones obtained above. With transfers, a mechanism is defined by (d, t) where
d : (XN)2 → [N ] denotes the project choice as before, and t : (XN)2 → R
denotes the transfers from the principal to the agent. Note that we assume
ex-post verifiability of the profit values pd(p,a) once the project has been cho-
sen.
Consider the following mechanism:
d(p, a) = argmaxi∈[N ](pi + ai)
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and
t(pi, α) = pd(pi,α) − E[max
i∈[N ]
(pi + ai)]
Under this mechanism, the principal essentially sells the firm to the
agent. The principal charges the expected surplus under the efficient out-
come E[maxi∈[N ](pi + ai)] as a fixed cost which does not affect the agent’s
incentives. For any (p, a), the agent’s utility on reporting (pi, α) will be
ad(pi,α) + pd(pi,α) − E[maxi∈[N ](pi + ai)] and this is maximized by reporting
(p, a). The agent’s expected payoff is then 0. Thus, this mechanism is effi-
cient and optimal for the principal in the presence of transfers. Thus, while
the no-overselling constraint significantly empowers the principal, the gains
from the ability to make transfers are even higher. Note that incentive com-
patibility of the above mechanism relies on ex-post verifiability. However,
the mechanism with the same d as above and transfers given by
t(pi, α) = pid(pi,α) − E[max
i∈[N ]
(pi + ai)]
is outcome equivalent to the above mechanism and implementable if we allow
for transfers and assume no-overselling instead of ex-post verifiability.
4.4 Dynamics without recall
In order to understand environments in which information about the projects
is obtained sequentially, we investigate a dynamic version of the principal’s
problem in which there is no recall. In this setting, the agent observes the
profit pi and payoff ai for project i and must report these values to the
principal. The principal must then decide whether to select project i or
permanently abandon it. If the principal decides to abandon project i, the
agent then observes pi+1 and ai+1, and so on. In comparison to the static
setup studied earlier, the dynamics without recall setup empowers the princi-
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pal since the incentive constraints are weaker and also weakens him because
there is no recall. The question is whether the net effect is positive or neg-
ative. In this section, we find the optimal mechanism under this setup and
compare the expected profits with those from the optimal cutoff mechanism
in the static setup.
Lemma 8. In the dynamics without recall setup, the optimal incentive com-
patible mechanism is such that a project i is accepted if and only if pi ≥ ci
and ai ≥ ci and for all j < i, either pj < cj or aj < cj, where {ci}Ni=2 satisfies
ci−1 = ci +
1
2
(1− ci)3
with cN = 0.
The following plot demonstrates that the principal’s profit from the op-
timal cutoff mechanism in the static setup is (just barely) higher than that
from the optimal dynamic mechanism.
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While we considered some simple extensions in this section, there are
many interesting problems that remain unanswered. For instance, how much
does the principal gain in a dynamic model where the agent has to sequen-
tially report the project values and there is recall? Note that it is without loss
of generality to assume that the agent reports all the project values. This fol-
lows from the observation that any mechanism where the principal chooses a
project after learning only i project values is equivalent to a mechanism where
the principal learns all project values from the agent but decides based on
the first i project values. While the set of incentive compatible mechanisms
in the dynamic setup is strictly bigger than the set of table mechanisms, it
remains open whether there is a mechanism that generates higher expected
profit. Also, many of these results likely extend (with minor modifications)
to more general distributions–we leave this extension as future work.
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5 Conclusion
In a principal agent problem of project selection with the partial verifiabil-
ity constraint of no-overselling, we find a neat characterization of the set
of incentive compatible mechanisms. We show that for two projects, a cut-
off mechanism is optimal. Based on this result, we conjecture that a cutoff
mechanism is optimal for any number of projects. We demonstrate that in
the class of cutoff mechanisms, there is a unique optimal mechanism and
that this mechanism is a single cutoff mechanism. We show that the cutoff
corresponding to this mechanism increases with the number of projects, and
that the principal’s expected profit under the optimal mechanism converges
to the upper bound of the support of the profit distribution (that is, the
maximum possible profit) as the number of projects tends to ∞.
On the contrary, we find that when the agent can oversell, the principal
can do no better than choosing a project randomly. However, in cases where
the principal can use transfers and there is ex-post verifiability, he can im-
plement the efficient mechanism and extract the entire surplus by essentially
selling the firm. Thus, we conclude that in settings where transfers are not
feasible, there are significant gains to be had for the principal from the no-
overselling constraint.
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6 Appendix
Proof of Theorem 3. Note that since we are maximizing a continuous func-
tion over a compact space, a solution exists. We proceed in three steps. In
step 1, we show that in any cutoff mechanism which has a cutoff that is 0
or 1 cannot be optimal. That is, the solution must be interior. In step 2,
we show that a cutoff mechanism with different cutoffs cannot be optimal.
Finally, we maximize the principal’s utility with respect to the single cutoff
c to get the optimal cutoff mechanism.
For any arbitrary cutoff mechanism with cutoffs c = (c1, c2...cN−1), we
compute the expected utility of the principal. For the below expressions,
consider cN = 0.
EUp(c) =
N∑
i=1
(1 + ci)
2
P(d = i)
Note that P(d = i) = (1 − ci)P(d = N |ci = 0). That is, conditional on
pi ≥ ci, the probability that the decision is i is the same as the probability
that the decision is N when the cutoff ci = 0 and the remaining cutoffs
are the same. To find the probability that the last project N is chosen, we
condition on its rank which is defined in terms of ais. That is, the rank of N
is k if there are exactly k − 1 projects with higher ais.
P(d = N) =
N∑
k=1
P(rank of N = k)P(d = N | rank of N = k)
=
1
N
N∑
k=1
P(d = N | rank of N = k)
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=
1
N
N∑
k=1
∑
S⊂[N−1]:|S|=k−1
Πi∈Sci(
N−1
k−1
)
We first argue that cutoffs have to be interior in the optimal cutoff mech-
anism. Suppose d is a cutoff mechanism with cutoffs c = (c1, c2...cN−1) and
ci = 1. In this case, let u
∗ denote the expected utility of the principal. Note
that u∗ < 1. Define a new cutoff mechanism in which all cutoffs remain the
same except for i which now has the cutoff u∗. Now, with probability u∗,
the principal gets u∗ and with probability 1−u∗, the principal gets a convex
combination of u∗ and 1+u
∗
2
> u∗. This means that his expected payoff under
the new mechanism is > u∗. Therefore, an optimal mechanism cannot have
the cutoff 1. Now, suppose there is an i ∈ [N − 1] which has a cutoff of
0. Observe that the expected utility from any arbitrary project conditional
on being chosen is 1+c
2
≥ 0.5. Now, consider increasing the cutoff to ci = 12
in the new mechanism while keeping every other cutoff the same. For every
pi <
1
2
, under the old mechanism, the principal’s payoff was some convex
combination of pi and some k ≥ 1/2. Under the new mechanism, it is just
k > pi. For pi ≥ 12 , the new mechanism is identical to the old one. Therefore,
an optimal mechanism cannot have a cutoff of 0. Thus, we know that in the
optimal cutoff mechanism, ci /∈ {0, 1} for any i ∈ [N − 1].
Now suppose that the mechanism d is such that there exist i, j with
ci > cj. Define t so that c¯ + t = ci and c¯ − t = cj. From the above cal-
culations, we know that if we write EUp(c) in expanded form and plug in
ci = c¯ + t and cj = c¯ − t, we get a polynomial that is at most cubic in t.
This is because we get a term that is at most quadratic in t for P(d = k) for
any k ∈ [n] and in the expected utility calculation, we multiply that with
1+ck
2
. Note that by the symmetry of the projects, the principal should get
the same expected utility if we changed t to −t. Therefore, the polynomial
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should be of the form at2+b. Now, if a is > 0 or < 0, the principal gains from
increasing or decreasing t which is possible since we know that the solution
is interior and ci > cj. Therefore, d cannot be optimal in either case. When
a = 0, the principal is indifferent to increasing t till one of the cutoffs reaches
an extreme of 1 or 0 which we know cannot be optimal. Therefore, a cutoff
mechanism with different cutoffs cannot be optimal.
The above discussion implies that the solution to the optimization prob-
lem has to be a single cutoff mechanism. Let c be the single cutoff. Using
the above calculations, we have that
P(d = N) =
1
N
N∑
k=1
∑
S⊂[N−1]:|S|=k−1
Πi∈Sci(
N−1
k−1
)
=
1
N
N∑
k=1
ck−1
=
1
N
1− cN
1− c
Therefore,
EUp(c) =
1
2
P(d = N) +
1 + c
2
P(d 6= N)
=
1
2
+
c
2
(
1− 1− c
N
N(1− c)
)
Differentiating with respect to c gives the desired optimal cutoff mecha-
nism defined by single cutoff c(N).
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∂EUp(c)
∂c
=
1
2
(
1− 1− c
N
N(1− c)
)
− c
2N
(
(1− c)(−NcN−1) + (1− cN)
(1− c)2
)
=
1
2
+
cN
2(1− c) −
1− cN
2N(1− c)2
Setting it equal to zero gives us:
N(1− c)(1− c+ cN) = 1− cN
Plugging in the expected utility expression gives us the maximum utility
of the principal in the class of cutoff mechanisms: 1
2
+ c(N)
2
(c(N)−c(N)N).
Proof of Lemma 6. First, we establish the equivalence of the first 2 state-
ments.
Suppose d is such that there exists S ⊂ [N ] and d(p, a) = argmaxi{ai :
i ∈ S}. This mechanism is clearly incentive compatible because the agent is
always getting his favorite project from his option set S which is the range
of the mechanism.
Suppose d is an incentive compatible mechanism. Let S = {i ∈ N :
there exists (p, a) ∈ X2N with d(p, a) = i} be the range of the mechanism.
Note that at any profile (p, a), the agent can implement any project i ∈ S by
reporting the appropriate (pi, α). To incentivize truth-telling at (p, a), it has
to be the case that the agent’s favorite project is chosen from S. Formally,
for any (p, a)
d(p, a) = argmaxi{ai : i ∈ S}
Thus, any incentive compatible mechanism has to be of the form described
in the 2nd statement.
The equivalence of the 2nd and 3rd statement follows in a straightforward
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manner by letting
S = {i ∈ [N ] : fi(p) = 1 for all p ∈ XN}
Proof of Lemma 8. We find the optimal mechanism in this setup by back-
ward induction. When the agent investigates projectN−1, both the principal
and the agent know that project N will be chosen if project N−1 is rejected.
Therefore, they want to accept project N − 1 if and only if its returns are
greater than the expected returns from project N . As a result, in the optimal
incentive compatible mechanism, the principal accepts project N − 1 if and
only if pN−1 ≥ 12 and aN−1 ≥ 12 . Similarly, they would want project N − 2 to
be accepted iff the returns from accepting are at least as much as the returns
from rejecting which we can now compute. Repeating this, we obtain the
optimal incentive compatible mechanism in this setup.
Note that the cutoff for a project i−1, ci−1 is equal to the expected profit
upon rejecting project i− 1. This gives the recursion:
ci−1 =
1 + ci
2
(1− ci)2 + (1− (1− ci)2)ci
because with probability (1 − ci)2, the principal gets an expected profit of
1+ci
2
, and with the remaining probability, the principal rejects project i which
gives an expected profit of ci. Simplifying this gives the recursive relation as
stated in the lemma.
Consequently, the expected profit for the principal from this mechanism is
1
2
(1− c1(N)3 + 3c1(N)2 − c1(N))
28
